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A PROPOSAL TO BRING THE BECCA BILL'S
RUNAWAY-DETENTION PROVISIONS INTO
COMPLIANCE WITH JUVENILES' PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS
Carrie A. Tracy
Abstract- The Becca Bill, enacted in Washington State in 1995, changed the way
Washington treats runaway juveniles. The Bill creates a series of secure crisis residential
centers and authorizes law enforcement officers to take juvenile runaways into custody and
place them in these secure facilities. The facilities must keep the admitted juveniles for at least
twenty-four hours but no more than five days. This Comment argues that the Becca Bill,
which provides no judicial review of the commitment to detention, violates the procedural due
process requirements of Washington and U.S. constitutions. While courts have extended
procedural due process protection to juveniles' liberty interest in freedom from bodily
restraint in the context of both juvenile delinquency proceedings and commitment for mental
health care, no court has considered the due process rights of juvenile runaways in
Washington. This Comment concludes that the Becca Bill's runaway detention provisions
violate constitutional procedural due process requirements and, therefore, the Washington
Legislature should amend the Becca Bill to provide judicial review of a juvenile's detention
within twenty-four hours of the juvenile's commitment to detention. In the absence of
legislative action to correct this problem, courts should require such review.
After leaving a home where his stepfather drank and beat him,
sixteen-year-old "Damian" lived on the streets of Yakima, where he used
marijuana.' Eventually Damian approached a local police officer and
asked for help.2 The officer took him to the Epic Center, a locked facility
created under the Becca Bill3 to shelter runaway juveniles. Damian lived
at the Epic Center for three days and received counseling, which he said
"opened up a new world" for him.4 When he left the Epic Center,
Damian went to a thirty-day substance-abuse treatment center.5 His
family also received counseling; his stepfather stopped drinking.6
A year later, however, the Becca Bill's involuntary custody provisions
resulted in a violation of Damian's constitutional rights. According to
1. See Ruth Teichroeb, Troubled Teens Meet Reality at Center, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Jan. 12,
2000, at A10.
2. See id.
3. 1995 Wash. Laws ch. 312 (codified in scattered sections of Wash. Rev. Code §§ 13.04, 13.32A,
28A.225, 28A.600, 36.18,43.43,46.20,46.82, 70.96A, 71.34, 74.13, 82.14).





Damian, one day he told his mother that he was going to a neighbor's to
buck hay.7 Because his mother did not want him to go, she called the
police and reported him as a runaway.8 The police returned Damian to
the Epic Center.9 Instead of protecting a runaway from the dangers of the
streets, this second detention entangled the State in a mother's punitive
actions; instead of providing an at-risk youth with needed services, this
detention merely gave Damian a bed, meals, and some company." Not
only was this visit a great expense to the State, but it was not a visit
Damian believed he needed."
The Becca Bill was named after Becca Hedman who, after running
away repeatedly, was murdered in Spokane. 2 Becca's parents joined the
parents of other runaways in demanding that the Washington State
Legislature provide parents and law enforcement officials more options
for controlling runaway youths. 3 Parents complained that police refused
to pick up children when they found them on the street.'4 Police officers
expressed frustration at seeing the same youths on the street only hours
after the police had taken them to non-secure crisis residential centers. 5
Parent advocacy groups asked the legislature to create short-term secure
facilities where runaway children could be detained.' 6 These groups also
asked for legislation that would allow parents to control their children
with the state's assistance. 7 Parents such as Becca's father believed that
these measures would allow parents to remove their children from the






12. Rebecca Hedman, or Becca, first ran away from her parents' Tacoma home when she was 12
years old. See Kery Murakami, Would 'Becca Bill' Have Saved Becca?, Seattle Times, June 23,
1995, at Al. Becca ran away several more times within the next year, began using marijuana and
cocaine, became a prostitute, and suffered terrible abuse. See id. She moved to a non-secure
residential drug treatment center in Spokane, but continued to run away periodically. See id. She last
ran away from the center in 1993, when she was 13. See id. She returned to the streets of Spokane,
where a man who had offered her money for sex murdered her. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.; see also infra note 37.





The Becca Bill and Due Process
The legislature responded in 1995 by passing the Becca Bill, 9 which
was amended in 199620 and 1997.21 The Bill provides parents and law
enforcement officials with more authority to detain and treat runaway
juveniles.' Then-Governor Michael Lowry reluctantly approved a
provision in the Bill allowing the state to hold youths for up to five days
in secure centers without judicial review of their commitment to
detention.'
Many providers of social services to runaways and advocates for
children oppose the provisions of the Becca Bill that allow the state to
detain children.24 They warn that such a system drives children away
from social services and state assistance.' This makes runaways more
vulnerable to those who exploit them by reducing the number of such
services that runaways accept and reducing the likelihood that runaways
leave the streets with the assistance of state programs. 26 These advocates
also question whether such measures violate constitutional due process
rights.27 Since the Becca Bill's enactment, neither the legislature nor any
Washington court has responded to these constitutional concerns.
This Comment examines whether the Becca Bill's runaway detention
provisions violate the Due Process Clauses of the Washington and U.S.
constitutions. Part I describes the Becca Bill's provisions that allow
19. 1995 Wash. Laws ch. 312 (codified at Wash. Rev. Code §§ 13.04, 13.32A, 28A.225,
28A.600, 36.18, 43.43, 46.20, 46.82, 70.96A, 71.34, 74.13, 82.14).
20. See 1996 Wash. Laws ch. 133 (codified at Wash. Rev. Code §§ 13.32A, 13.34, 28A.225,
70.96A, 71.13,71.34).
21. See 1997 Wash. Laws ch. 146 (codified in Wash. Rev. Code § 74.13.037 and scattered
sections of§ 13.32A).
22. See Mistee R Pitman, Comment, The Becca Bill: A Step Toward Helping Washington
Families, 34 Gonz. L. Rev. 385, 392 (1999).
23. See Kery Murakami, Lowry Opposes Bill to Detain Runavays, Seattle Times, Mar. 30, 1995
at B3.
24. See Jolayne Houtz, Putting Brakes on Runaway Kids, Pressure Grows to Give Parents More
Control, Seattle Times, Jan. 31, 1995, at Al.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See Ruth Teichroeb, State's Lockup Policy for Runaways May Violate Federal Law, Seattle
Post-Intelligencer, Jan. 12, 2000, at A10.
28. The Becca Bill's detention provisions may also violate the U.S. Constitution's prohibition of
unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S. Const. amend IV. However, this Comment addresses
only the due process questions raised by the Becca Bill's runaway detention provisions because
courts have applied a due process analysis to analogous detention situations. See, e.g., In re Young,
122 Wash. 2d 1, 43-44, 857 P.2d 989, 1010 (1993); In re Harris, 98 Wash. 2d 276, 285, 654 P.2d
1401
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parents and police to detain juveniles against their will in secure crisis
residential centers. Part II analyzes the procedural due process rights
accorded to juveniles under the Washington and U.S. constitutions. Part
III concludes that the Becca Bill's runaway detention provisions violate
the procedural due process rights of juveniles by allowing the state to
detain them against their will without a hearing. Finally, this Comment
proposes in Part IV that Washington should afford juvenile runaways
judicial review within twenty-four hours of their commitment to
detention in a secure facility.
I. THE BECCA BILL
The Washington Legislature designed the Becca Bill to provide state
authorities and parents with additional tools for assisting troubled
juveniles.29 The statute authorizes law enforcement officials to take
runaway juveniles into custody and, under certain circumstances, place
them in secure crisis residential centers against their will.3"
A. The Becca Bill Was Designed to Provide State Intervention and
Assistance to Troubled Families, Particularly Families of Runaway
Children
The Becca Bill creates secure crisis residential centers in which
juvenile runaways can be held for up to five days.3' The Bill authorizes
law enforcement officials to take juvenile runaways into custody and to
commit them for detention in the secure crisis residential centers.32 Once
admitted to the secure facility, a juvenile can only be removed from the
facility with a parent's consent.33 The statute provides no judicial review-
of this commitment to detention and the facility administrator has very
limited authority to transfer a child from a secure facility to a non-secure
facility.
109, 113 (1982). The Bill may also violate a parent's liberty interest in raising children free from
state intervention. However, this question is beyond the scope of this Comment.
29. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.010 (1998).
30. See Wash. Rev. Code § 74.13.032(1), (4) (1998); see also infra note 37 and accompanying
text.
31. See Wash. Rev. Code § 74.13.032(1), (4); see also infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
32. See Wash. Rev. Code §§ 13.32A.050, .060, .065 (1998); see also infra notes 40-59 and
accompanying text.
33. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.130 (1998).
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1. General Provisions of the Becca Bill
The Becca Bill is a package of provisions designed to address a
variety of problems concerning youths. The Bill provides several new
procedures for parents and the state to control youths.34 The Bill also
creates ways for children and parents to access state services for children
and their families.35 The Bill attempts to address the issues surrounding
runaways by authorizing law enforcement officials to take runaways into
custody and by establishing secure facilities in which runaways can be
held.36
A crisis residential center (CRC) is a well-staffed, structured group-
care facility that provides treatment, supervision, and support for
juveniles.37 A secure CRC is locked or has a secured perimeter and is
designed and operated to prevent the resident juveniles from leaving
without staff permission.38 The Becca Bill requires that where a secure
CRC is located in or near a juvenile detention facility, the facilities must
minimize contact between those housed in the secure CRC and the
residents of the detention facility.39
34. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.010. The legislative findings refer to the at-risk-youth
provisions and the secure crisis residential centers, for example. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.010.
35. The Bill addresses two types of petitions: the child in need of services petition, which a child,
parent, or the state may file, and the at-risk youth petition, which a parent may file. See Wash. Rev.
Code §§ 13.32A.140, .150, .152, .160, .170, .179, .180, .190, .191, .192, .194, .196, .197, .198
(1998). Through court intervention, the petitions endeavor to provide troubled children and families
with access to services that might resolve the families' issues. See Pitman, supra note 22, at 392.
36. See infra Part LA.2.
37. See Wash. Rev. Code § 74.13.032(1), (4) (1998). Semi-secure CRCs are required to be
operated in a manner to "reasonably assure that youth placed there will not run away." Wash. Rev.
Code § 13.32A.030(15) (1998). Administrators of semi-secure facilities are required to establish
policies to ensure that residents who are permitted to leave and return to the facility do so at
appropriate times and with appropriate conditions on their movements. See Wash. Rev. Code
§ 13.32A.030(15).
38. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.030(14) (1998).
39. See Wash. Rev. Code § 74.13.032(6) (1998). The 1995 bill prohibited a CRC from being built
on the same grounds as other secure facilities, including jails and juvenile detention centers, without
a written finding that such a location was the only practical location. See 1995 Wash. Laws ch. 312
§ 60(6). A 1998 amendment removed this language. See 1998 Wash. Laws ch. 296 § 4(6).
1403
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2. The Becca Bill Establishes Procedures by Which Runaway
Children Are Returned to Their Homes or Taken to Secure Crisis
Residential Centers
There are several ways in which runaway children enter secure CRCs
set up by the statute. One manner in which a child4" becomes subject to
the provisions of the Becca Bill is when the child's parents41 notify a law
enforcement agency that the child has run away. 2 When a parent reports
a child as a runaway to a law enforcement agency, an officer who
encounters the child must take the child into custody. 3 An officer may
also take a child into custody when the officer encounters the child and
reasonably believes, considering the time of day, place, and age of the
child, that the child is in a dangerous situation. 4
The runaway provisions also apply to children subject to court or
agency authority.45 An officer must take a child into custody under the
following circumstances: (1) if an agency legally charged with the
supervision of the child reports the child has run away from placement,46
(2) if the juvenile court notifies the law enforcement agency that the
child has violated a court placement order, or (3) if the court issues an
order for law enforcement pickup of the child.47 When taking a child into
custody under these conditions, the officer must inform the child of the
reason for this custody and take the child to the supervising agency or to
a secure CRC.48 If the child is suspected of violating a court order, the
40. The statute defines "child," "juvenile," and "youth" as any unemancipated person under 18
years old. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.030(3) (1998).
41. The statute defines "parent" to include a child's custodian or guardian. See Wash. Rev. Code
§ 13.32A.030(13) (1998).
42. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.050(l)(a) (1998).
43. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.050(1)(a) (1998).
44. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.050(l)(b) (1998). In locations with curfews, an officer may
also take a child into custody for violating that curfew. See Wash Rev. Code § 13.32A.050(l)(b).
45. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.050 (1998).
46. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.050(l)(c).
47. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.050(l)(d). The officer must take a child to a juvenile detention
facility, rather than a secure CRC, whenever he or she knows that a court has entered a detention
order for the child. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.060(2) (1998).
48. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.060(2). When the officer has been notified that the juvenile
court has issued a detention order for the youth the officer must take the youth to detention. See
Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.060(2).
1404
Vol. 75:1399, 2000
The Becca Bill and Due Process
officer may take the child either to a secure CRC or to a juvenile
detention center.
49
After a child is in custody, law enforcement officers must deliver the
child to a parent or to a secure CRC unless the child has violated or is
subject to an earlier court order.5 The officer must first attempt to return
the child to his or her home or to a parent's place of employment.5 ' A
parent may request that the officer deliver the child to the home of a
family member or friend, a licensed youth shelter, a secure CRC, or the
Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) as the state
department responsible for children dependent on the state. 2 If no parent
is available to accept custody of the child,53 if it is impractical to
transport the child to a parent's home or workplace,54 or if the child
seems so frightened or unwilling to go home that the officer believes that
the child is experiencing abuse or neglect, the officer must take the child
to a secure CRC."
Finally, the Becca Bill establishes procedures for review of
commitment to detention for a juvenile who is the subject of a detention
order by a juvenile court. When an officer takes a child into custody for
violating a court placement order, the officer may take the child to a
secure CRC or a juvenile detention center.56 When an officer takes a
child into custody because a juvenile court has entered a detention order
for the child, the officer must place the child in a juvenile detention
center.5 A juvenile detention center must provide the child with a
detention review hearing within twenty-four hours.5 If the court orders
the child to remain in detention, the court must hold a hearing on
contempt within seventy-two hours, excluding weekends and holidays.59
49. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.060(2).
50. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.060 (1998).
51. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.060(1)(a).
52. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.060(1)(a).
53. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.060(1)(b)(iii).
54. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.060(l)(b)(ii).
55. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.060(l)(b)(i).
56. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.060(2) (1998).
57. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.060(2).
58. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.065(I) (1998) In Part I.A.2 and I.A.3 of this Comment, all
mandatory minimum time requirements for hearings exclude weekends and holidays.
59. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.065(2) (1998).
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3. The Becca Bill Provides Some Juveniles Judicial Review of Their
Commitment to Detention, but Does Not Provide Juvenile
Runaways with Judicial Review
In some situations, Washington statutes provide juveniles with prompt
judicial review of their commitment to detention. A juvenile taken into
custody because a juvenile court has found probable cause exists to
believe that the child has violated a court placement order, or because the
court has issued an order for law enforcement to pick up the child, must
be given a probable cause hearing within twenty-four hours.' When a
child is detained by an officer for treatment, the state must provide the
child a commitment hearing within seventy-two hours of admission.6
A child admitted to a secure CRC, however, must remain in the
facility at least twenty-four hours unless removed by a parent,62 but no
more than five days. 63 During the first twenty-four hours, the
administrator of the secure facility must determine whether the child will
likely run away from a semi-secure facility. 64 If the administrator
determines that the child would likely run away from a semi-secure
facility, the administrator must keep the child in the secure facility.65 An
administrator may only transfer a child if he or she determines that the
child is not likely to leave the semi-secure facility.' Moreover, the
administrator may transfer a child back from a semi-secure facility to a
60. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.065 (1998).
61. See Wash. Rev. Code § 71.34.080 (1998).
62. The Bill provides that a parent can remove a child from the CRC at any time, as long as the
administrator of the CRC has no reason to believe that the child is in danger of abuse or neglect if
returned to the parent's home. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.130(4) (1998).
63. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.130(l) (1998).
64. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.130(2)(a)(i) (1998).
65. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.130(2)(a)(ii) (1998). The administrator must take into
consideration:
(A) the child's age and maturity; (B) the child's condition upon arrival at the center; (C) the
circumstances that led to the child's being taken to the center; (D) whether the child's behavior
endangers the health, safety, or welfare of the child or any other person; (E) the child's history
of running away which has endangered the health, safety and welfare of the child; and (F) the
child's willingness to cooperate in the assessment.
Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.130(2)(a)(ii).
66. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.130(2)(b) (1998).
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secure facility at any time that he or she reasonably believes that the
child is likely to leave the semi-secure facility. 7
In 1996, the legislature amended the Becca Bill to limit the amount of
time a child could spend in the secure CRCs without the permission of a
parent or some action by the state to ensure that the child would be
released into state or parental supervision. The amendment required that
a child placed in a CRC or assigned by DSHS to an out-of-home
placement"8 remain in that facility or placement for no more than
seventy-two hours without parental permission, the filing of a child in
need of services petition, or a court order for an out-of-home
placement. 9 This provision imposed a duty upon the state to prepare a
plan within seventy-two hours to release the child into parental or state
supervision at the end of the permitted five-day detention.
B. State and Counties Lack the Resources To Implement Fully the
Becca Bill's Purpose and Mandates
Delays in establishing the secure CRC facilities required by the statute
have hampered implementation of the runaway provisions. No secure
CRCs existed in 1995 when the legislature passed the Bill; one facility
began operating in 1997 and five more opened in 1999.70 At the
beginning of 2000, only thirty-four of the envisioned seventy-five beds
existed.7 The most populated and urban county in the state, King
County, has not yet built a secure CRC.72 Although legislators intended
the secure CRCs to be free-standing facilities devoted to housing and
67. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.130(2)(d) (1998). If administrators transfer a child between
semi-secure and secure facilities, the aggregate time that the child spends in all of these facilities
must not exceed five days. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.130(1).
68. "Out of home placement" is a placement in a foster home or group care facility, or placement
in a home other than that of the child's parent, guardian, or legal custodian. See Wash. Rev. Code
§ 13.32A.030(12) (1998).
69. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.060(3) (1998).
70. See Ruth Teichroeb, State's Runaway Centers Provoke Controversy, Seattle Post-
Intelligencer, Jan. 12, 2000, at Al.
71. See id. Zoning restrictions and opposition from potential neighbors have stymied attempts to
open free-standing facilities in some areas. See id. The state reimburses the CRCs for each bed at a
daily rate regardless of whether the beds are empty or full; this guaranteed income is attractive to
counties burdened by increasing numbers of juveniles being sent to juvenile detention as a result of




helping only juvenile runaways,73 half of the beds are located in juvenile
detention centers.74
The state has no empirical data to indicate whether CRCs have
fulfilled the legislature's goals because the state does not track children
after they leave the centers.75 One function of the CRCs is to identify the
problems that have driven resident juveniles onto the streets and to
connect these juveniles with services to address these problems. 76 There
is a shortage of services available to juveniles in the state to address their
problems.77 For example, juveniles who cannot pay for drug or mental
health treatment often have to wait months for space to become available
in the existing subsidized treatment programs.78
Many debate the efficacy of the secure CRCs.79 Some argue that the
secure CRCs are necessary to protect children and enforce the right of
parents to control their children.8" For example, the director of Yakima's
Epic Center, the first secure CRC to be established, said: "These kids are
screaming, 'Care enough to stop me.' We're having great success at
getting to kids before they become a statistic."'" Others argue that the
secure CRCs are excessively punitive, costly, and curtail children's
rights.8" Some child advocates and social workers say that the centers are
expensive facilities designed to punish children for trying to escape
troubled homes.83 They argue that five days are insufficient to
accomplish all that the children need and that inadequate funding of






76. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.010 (1998).
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II. THE WASHINGTON AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONS PROTECT
MINORS FROM DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY WITHOUT DUE
PROCESS OF LAW
Both the Washington and U.S. constitutions provide that no person
shall be deprived of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law."8' Thus, state deprivation of any of these protected interests is
unconstitutional unless accompanied by adequate procedural
safeguards.8 6 Constitutionally adequate procedures generally require that
a hearing precede any deprivation of liberty or property.87 Because the
Supreme Court of Washington has held that the state's due process
protection is largely coextensive with that of the U.S. Constitution,8 this
section will treat the respective constitutional analyses together.89
A. Juveniles 'Due Process Rights Are Not Coextensive with the Due
Process Rights ofAdults in Detention Situations
In discussing the nature of juveniles' due process rights, courts
invariably have repeated two established tenets of due process law: (1)
juveniles have due process rights, yet (2) those rights are not exactly the
same as due process rights of adults.9" The U.S. Supreme Court
established juvenile due process protections in the context of juvenile
delinquency proceedings in In re Gault,9 declaring that "neither the
85. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Wash. Const. art. I, § 3.
86. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).
87. See id. at 542.
88. See Washington v. Manussier, 129 Wash. 2d 652, 679-80, 921 P.2d 473, 486 (1996). In
Manussier, the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of Washington's "three strikes law." See id.
at 658, 921 P.2d at 476. The law required trial courts to sentence persons convicted of a third felony,
which fell into a statutorily defined category, to life imprisonment without possibility of parole. See
id. at 659, 921 P.2d at 476. The court held that the law did not violate procedural due process. See id.
at 682, 921 P.2d at 488. The Court applied the Gumwall test, which uses six nonexclusive factors to
evaluate whether the Washington Constitution provides more extensive protections than the U.S.
Constitution: "'(1) the textual language; (2) differences in the texts; (3) constitutional and common
law history; (4) preexisting state law; (5) structural differences; and (6) matters of particular state or
local concern."' Id. at 679, 921 P.2d at 486 (quoting State v. Gunwall. 106 Wash. 2d 54, 58, 720
P.2d 808, 811 (1986)). After applying this test, the court concluded that the Washington
Constitution's due process requirements would be satisfied by an application of the federal due
process test. See id.
89. Although due process considerations include two analyses, substantive due process and
procedural due process, this Comment will discuss only procedural due process.
90. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984).
91. 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
1409
Washington Law Review
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone. 9 2 In
that case, the Court rejected the argument that the state, as parens
patriae,93 could deny due process protections to juveniles.94 The argument
that the Court rejected was based on the notion that juveniles, unlike
adults, have a right to custody rather than liberty. Nevertheless, in
subsequent cases, the Court has expressed exactly this rejected sentiment
as justification for limiting the due process made available to juveniles. 96
In Schall v. Martin,97 for example, even as the Court repeated that the
due process clause is applicable to juvenile delinquency proceedings, it
countered this strong statement with a reminder that a juvenile's liberty
interest may in some situations be subordinated to state interests in
protecting the juvenile.98
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that, in the context of the
juvenile delinquency system, juveniles are entitled to certain basic
constitutional protections.99 These protections include the right to notice
of charges,' the right to counsel,'' the privilege against self-
incrimination,0 2 the right to confrontation and cross examination of
witnesses,'0 3 the use of the standard "proof beyond a reasonable
doubt,"'t' t and the principle of double jeopardy.0 5 However, the Court
has refused to extend the right to jury trial to juveniles in juvenile court




93. The phrase parens patriae originated in chancery practice, where it described the role of the
state in protecting the property rights and the person of a child in the absence of a parent. See id. at
16.
94. See id. at 13.
95. See id. at 17.
96. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).
97. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
98. See id. at 265-66.
99. See id. at 263.
100. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1967).
101. See id. at 36.
102. See id. at 55.
103. See id. at 57.
104. Schall, 467 U.S. at 263.
105. See id.
106. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (stating that requiring extension of
right to jury trials in juvenile delinquency proceedings could "remake the juvenile proceeding into a
1410
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The Court has also recognized that due process protections apply to
juveniles not only in delinquency proceedings, but also in commitment
for mental health care proceedings and pretrial detention contexts. In
Parham v. J.R.,"°7 the Court questioned the procedural due process
compliance of a Georgia statute that allowed a parent to institutionalize a
child for mental health care without a judicial hearing.'08 In Schall v.
Martin, the Court held that a state procedure that gave juveniles detained
while awaiting trial prompt judicial review of their commitment to
detention would satisfy procedural due process requirements.' 9 Courts
have held in a broad spectrum of situations, therefore, that due process
protections apply to juveniles.
B. The U.S. Constitution Guarantees Due Process Procedural
Safeguards Before Citizens May Be Deprived of "Life, Liberty, or
Property "
The U.S. Supreme Court developed the principle test for procedural
due process in Mathews v. Eldridge."' The Mathews balancing test
requires consideration of three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail."'
Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Washington
have applied the Mathews test to procedural due process questions
regarding adult and juvenile detention." 2 The U.S. Supreme Court has
fully adversary process [that] will put an effective end to what has been the idealistic prospect of an
intimate, informal protective proceeding").
107. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
108. Id. at 600-01.
109. 467 U.S. at 275.
110. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
111. Id. at335.
112. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (applying Mathews test to
pretrial detention on grounds of future dangerousness); In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d 1, 43-44, 857
P.2d 989, 1010 (1993) (applying Mathews test to involuntary detention of sexually violent
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also held that procedural due process protections must occur at a
meaningful time if they are to be effective. 3
1. The Relative Weight of an Individual's Liberty Interest in Freedom
from Bodily Restraint
Both Washington state and federal courts have recognized that due
process protects an individual's right to freedom from bodily restraint.1
4
Minor children have this constitutionally protected interest as well as
adults." '5 The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that juveniles accused of
delinquency and held in pretrial detention have a substantial interest in
freedom from institutional restraint." 6 In Parham v. JR.,"7 the Court
acknowledged that unnecessary confinement for medical treatment and
commitment for psychiatric care may threaten a child's liberty interest
and cause the child harm." 8 The Court also acknowledged the traditional
assumption that parents have a strong interest in making decisions about
their children's lives.' The Court finally struck a balance between these
two interests:
[W]e conclude that our precedents permit the parents to retain a
substantial, if not the dominant, role in the decision, absent a
finding of neglect or abuse, and that the traditional presumption
that the parents act in the best interests of the child should apply.
We also conclude, however, that the child's rights and the nature of
predators); In re Harris, 98 Wash. 2d 276, 285, 654 P.2d 109, 113 (1982) (applying Mathews test to
involuntary commitment for mental health treatment).
113. See infra notes 165-73 and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) ("Freedom from bodily restraint has
always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary
governmental action.") (citation omitted); Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750 (stating "[w]e do not minimize
the importance and fundamental nature" of the "individual's strong interest in liberty"); Jones v.
United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983) ("It is clear that commitment for any purpose constitutes a
significant deprivation of liberty that re,1uires due process protection.") (citation omitted); Young,
122 Wash. 2d at 26, 857 P.2d at 1000 (evaluating statute that allowed state to involuntarily commit
persons as sexually violent predators); Harris, 98 Wash. 2d at 279, 654 P.2d at 110 (evaluating
statute that allowed persons to be detained for up to three days without judicial hearing through
summons procedure for involuntary civil commitment).
115. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600-01 (1979).
116. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253,265 (1984).
117. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
118. Seeid. at 600.
119. See id. at 602.
1412
Vol. 75:1399, 2000
The Becca Bill and Due Process
the commitment decision are such that parents cannot always have
absolute and unreviewable discretion to decide whether to have a
child institutionalized.
20
This decision shows that juveniles' liberty interest can be strong enough
to limit the power of competing parental interests.
Similarly, in In re Harris,2' the Supreme Court of Washington found
that a summons procedure that allowed a county-designated mental
health professional to authorize apprehension and detention of a young
woman 22 for involuntary civil commitment, based only on an affidavit
submitted by the young woman's mother, substantially affected a private
interest." Although the summons authorized detention for only seventy-
two hours, the court found that confinement for a period of that length
still constituted a "massive curtailment of liberty."' 24
In considering the relative weight of the private interest at stake,
courts have recognized that violating a juvenile's interest in freedom
from bodily restraint may not only harm the juvenile but also threaten the
state's ability to influence and assist the juvenile. For example, in In re
Gault,"u Justice Fortas expressed concern that procedures lacking in due
process measures would "constitute a further obstacle to effective
treatment of the delinquent to the extent that they engender in the child a
sense of injustice provoked by seemingly all-powerful and challengeless
exercise of authority."'26
A Washington State Court of Appeals opinion, In re M.B., 27 recently
applied the Mathews test in a case involving juvenile status offenders and
provisions of the Becca Bill.' The opinion examined contempt orders
and the accompanying purge conditions that courts impose after finding
that juveniles have violated court orders originating in at-risk youth
petitions, child in need of services petitions, and truancy proceedings.
29
The court examined whether these contempt sanctions violated due
120. Id. at 604.
121. 98 Wash. 2d 276, 654 P.2d 109 (1982).
122. The court did not specify Ms. Harris's age in its decision.
123. See Harris, 98 Wash. 2d at 283, 654 P.2d at 112.
124. Id.
125. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
126. Id. at 26 (citation omitted).
127. 101 Wash. App. 425,3 P.3d 780 (2000).
128. See id. at 470-71, 3 P.3d at 804-05.
129. See id. at 431, 3 P.3d at 784.
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process in the cases of six individual juveniles.130 In one of these cases,
the court applied the Mathews test to the issue of whether the admission
of unsworn testimony in juvenile hearings violates due process. 3 ' The
court held that juveniles in this situation have an "obviously substantial"
liberty interest. 3
2. The Weight of the Government's Interest, Including the Fiscal and
Administrative Burdens ofAdditional or Substitute Procedures
A second factor of the Mathews test is the government's interest in
maintaining the contested procedures, including the possible additional
costs of any proposed alternative procedures.'33 Courts often look to the
legislature's statement of intent to find this interest. 34 Courts have
recognized a state's interest in assisting parents with juvenile
commitment for mental health treatment'35 and the state's parens patriae
interest in the welfare of the child.
3 6
The state's interest, however, does not always mirror that of parents.
For example, in In re Sumey,'37 the court acknowledged the state's
interest, articulated in the statutory statement of intent, in preserving the
family and supporting a parent's role in the family. 38 The court
recognized a "parental constitutional right to the care, custody, and
companionship of the child"'39 but also acknowledged that, when
parental actions threaten the physical or mental health of the child, the
state has a parens patriae right and responsibility to intervene to protect
the child.4 ° The court concluded that the state has an independent
interest in protecting the physical and mental health of minors from the
130. See id.
131. See id. at 470-71, 3 P.3d at 804-05.
132. Id. at 471, 3 P.3d at 805. The juvenile who challenged the use of unsworn testimony had
been ordered to detention for three days as a result of the hearing at which unsworn testimony was
introduced. See id. at 803.
133. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
134. See, e.g., In re Sumey, 94 Wash. 2d 757, 761, 621 P.2d 108, 110 (1980).
135. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 605 (1979).
136. See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984).
137. 94 Wash. 2d 757, 621 P.2d L08 (1980).
138. See id. at 761, 621 P.2d at 110.
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harms caused by extreme family conflict and the dangers that threaten
runaway juveniles.'4 '
This prong of the Mathews test also includes consideration of the
additional financial or administrative burdens presented by the proposed
additional procedural safeguards.'42 The Court in Mathews explained,
however, that cost is not a controlling factor.43 Cost is a problem where
the cost of the additional safeguard Js so high that it outweighs the
benefits of the procedure to society and the individual.' 44 The Court
reiterated that there is much more at stake in due process analysis than
fiscal considerations and that questions of fairness are paramount. 4 5
3. The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation of a Liberty Interest and
Probable Value ofAdditional Procedural Safeguards Such as
Hearings
Under the Mathews test, the U.S. Constitution generally requires some
kind of a hearing in order for a state to deprive a person of his or her
liberty.4 6 Therefore, courts have upheld statutes providing prompt
judicial hearings shortly after detention begins. 147 Courts have required
such hearings even when statutory schemes do not provide for them.'48
In Schall v. Martin,149 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a statute
permitting pretrial detention of juveniles based on a finding that there
was a serious risk that the juvenile would commit a crime before trial. By
providing a hearing before a court within seventy-two hours of
commitment to detention, the statute sufficiently reduced the risk of
141. See id. at 764-65, 621 P.2d at 111-12.




146. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990). This does not mean that the state can
never detain a person before providing a hearing. See id. at 132. ("[W]here a predeprivation hearing
is unduly burdensome in proportion to the liberty interest at stake.., or where the State is truly
unable to anticipate and prevent a random deprivation of a liberty interest, postdeprivation remedies
might satisfy due process.") (citation omitted).
147. See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256-57 (1984).
148. See, e.g., In re Harris, 98 Wash. 2d 276,288, 654 P.2d 109, 115 (1982).
149. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
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erroneous deprivations of liberty. 5 The Court noted that this provision
of a prompt hearing before a court and determination of probable cause
satisfied the requirements both of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ment's due process protections and of the Fourth Amendment's
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. 5
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Washington has recognized the value
of a hearing as a procedural safeguard in averting erroneous deprivations
of liberty interests. For example, in In re Young,'52 the court held that a
statute allowing involuntary commitment for sexually violent predators
without a probable cause hearing during the forty-five days prior to trial
was unconstitutional.'53 The court held that procedural due process
required a hearing for those detained under the statute within seventy-
two hours.'54
Similarly, the Harris court found that a mental health commitment
procedure inadequately eliminated the risk of erroneous deprivation of
the petitioner's liberty and, therefore, did not fulfill due process
requirements.'55 The statute addressed commitment of persons alleged to
pose a likelihood of serious harm to self or others due to a mental
disorder.'56 It allowed a mental health professional to summon such a
person to appear for evaluation and for treatment for up to seventy-two
hours.'57 This summons was permitted by the statute after the
professional had investigated the allegation.'58 The court held that the
150. See id. at 281. The Court noted in this finding that the statutory procedures also provided the
juvenile with notice of the hearing, notice of the rights to remain silent and to be represented by
counsel, allowed the juvenile to be accompanied by parent or guardian, and informed the juvenile of
the charges. See id. at 275.
151. See id. at 277. In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), the Court held that, under the
Fourth Amendment, adults arrested without a warrant must be provided "a fair and reliable
determination of probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty, and this
determination must be made by a judicial officer either before or promptly after arrest." Id. at 125.
Later, the Court refined this requirement by holding that any "jurisdiction that provides judicial
determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the
promptness requirement of Gerstein." Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991). When an
arrested individual does not receive a hearing within 48 hours, the government must show that it was
prevented from doing so by "a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance." Id. at 57.
152. 122 Wash. 2d 1,857 P.2d 989 (1993).
153. See id. at 46-47, 857 P.2d at 1011.
154. See id.
155. See In re Harris, 98 Wash. 2d 276, 287, 654 P.2d 109, 114 (1982).
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procedure's potential for deprivation of liberty required a neutral third
party to determine that the individual's situation justified detention.'59 In
balancing the interests, the court found that the risk of erroneous liberty
deprivation was high because the statute vested far too much authority in
a mental health professional."t The court described this as a "uniquely
judicial" determination.'
In reaching this decision the court noted that the traumatic effect of
involuntary civil commitment can be felt within a very short period of
confinement. This risk increases the importance of avoiding any
erroneous deprivation of liberty by such potentially harmful detention.'62
It based this finding in part on testimony before the U.S. Senate that "any
kind of forcible detention of a person in an alien environment may
seriously affect him in the first few days of detention, leading to all sorts
of acute traumatic and iatrogenic symptoms and troubles."' 63 The court
expressed concern that detention without due process could do more
harm than good by frightening people away from needed sources of
care.
164
When a court considers whether proposed additional procedural
safeguards will prevent erroneous deprivations of liberty, it must keep in
mind that the "fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity
to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.""' 165 In
Armstrong v. Manzo," the Court set aside an adoption decree because
the child's natural father was not given notice of the adoption
proceedings. 67 Notice and an opportunity to be heard, essential elements
of due process, were meaningless if they took place after the father had
lost the opportunity to oppose the adoption. 68 In Goss v. Lopez,' 69 the
159. See id. at 288-89, 654 P.2d at 115.
160. See id. at 286-87, 654 P.2d at 114.
161. Id. at288,654P.2dat 115.
162. See id. at 279, 654 P.2d at 111.
163. Id. at 279-80, 654 P.2d at 111 (quoting Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 210
(1969-70) (statement of Arthur Elson Cohen, member ACLU)).
164. See id. at 288, 654 P.2d at 115.
165. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,333 (1975) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,
552 (1965)).
166. 380 U.S. 545 (1965).
167. Id. at 552.
168. See id. at 551.
169. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
1417
Washington Law Review
Court held that students must be given some minimum notice and
hearing opportunity before even temporary suspensions from school. 7
The Court held that this opportunity must take place before the
suspension to comply with the requirement that the hearing take place at
a meaningful time. 7 The Court held that students have a protected
property interest in attending school.' The hearing prevents the
erroneous deprivation of that property interest by mistaken and arbitrary
suspensions. 1 Each of these cases required state actors to provide
hearings before the loss of some protected interest, regardless of the age
of the person whose interests were at stake.
C. Congress Has Codified the Right to Prompt Judicial Review of
Commitment to Detention of Juvenile Status Offenders
The federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974
(JJDPA) 174 requires judicial review of commitment to detention for
juvenile status offenders (those whose acts are only offenses when
committed by minors).175 States receiving federal funds to help pay for
juvenile justice programs must provide a hearing within twenty-four
hours, not including weekends and holidays.7 Congress enacted the
twenty-four hour review requirement in the JJDPA in response to
arguments that detaining status offenders without procedural safeguards
was counterproductive and contrary to the juvenile courts' rehabilitative
goal.
1 77
The JJDPA requires, as a condition of a state receiving formula grants,
that the state submit a document outlining the state's plan for compliance
with the requirements of the JJDPA' 7 8 For example, the state plan must
show that, within three years of submission of its plan, it will no longer
place juveniles charged with status offenses in secure detention or
170. Id. at 581.
171. See id. at 582.
172. See id. at 573.
173. Seeid. at581.
174. Pub.L. No. 93-415, 88 Stat. 1110 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601-5785 (1994)).
175. See Rayna Hardee Bomar, Note, The Incarceration of the Status Offender, 18 Memphis St.
U. L. Rev. 713, 720 (1988).
176. See 28 C.F.R. § 31.303(f)(iii)(2) (1999).
177. See Bomar, supra note 175, at 728.
178. See 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a) (1994).
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correctional facilities. 79 The state must also submit annual reports of the
progress made toward the goal of de-institutionalization, showing that
juveniles placed in secure facilities are placed in the least restrictive
alternatives appropriate to the needs of the child and the community.
80
The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), the
agency charged with implementing the JJDPA, has published regulations
that allow the state to hold accused status offenders in a secure detention
facility for up to twenty-four hours, excluding weekends and holidays,
before a court appearance, and for up to twenty-four hours more after an
initial court appearance.'' The OJJDP has determined that the Becca
Bill's secure CRC provisions are inconsistent with the requirements of
the JJDPA, and that Washington is no longer in compliance with that
Act.1
8 2
III. THE BECCA BILL DOES NOT PROVIDE JUVENILE
RUNAWAYS WITH DUE PROCESS OF LAW
A juvenile has a fundamental liberty interest in freedom from bodily
restraint and this interest is threatened by the secure CRC provisions of
the Becca Bill. The government's interest in protecting juveniles and
assisting their parents does not justify denying juvenile runaways the due
process protection of judicial review of their commitment. There is a
high risk of erroneous detention, and the harm that could be caused by
such a detention is high in the case of the secure CRCs. Therefore, the
Becca Bill currently violates procedural due process requirements.
A. The Becca Bill Violates the Due Process Rights ofJuveniles
Because Juveniles Have a Fundamental Right to Personal Liberty
The secure CRC provisions of the Becca Bill violate procedural due
process under the analysis established in Mathews v. Eldridge"8 3 by
179. See 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(12)(A).
180. See 42 U.S.C. § 5633(12)(B).
181. See 28 C.F.R. § 31.303(0(iii)(2).
182. See Letter from John J. Wilson, Acting Administrator, Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, to Gerald Sidorowicz, Assistant Secretary, Washington Department of
Social and Health Services, Office of Juvenile Justice (Mar. 10, 2000) (on file with author) (noting
that Washington state is in danger of losing some federal funding provided for juvenile justice
programs because of this finding of noncompliance).
183. 424 U.S. 319 (1975).
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threatening juveniles' constitutional liberty interest in "freedom from
bodily restraint." '184 Courts have already indicated that this interest is
implicated when juveniles are held in delinquency proceedings, 18 5 in
commitment for mental health care proceedings, 186 and in pretrial
detention.'87 The interest of a juvenile runaway in freedom from personal
restraint should be accorded the same weight accorded to juveniles in
other contexts. Even convicted sex offenders whom the court has labeled
predatory, triggering involuntarily commitment, have been found to have
a constitutional liberty interest that requires due process protection.
1 88
Juveniles who have been detained simply for leaving their parent's
homes before attaining the age of majority should not have a lesser
liberty interest under the procedural due process analysis than those who
have committed a crime or who are found to be dangerous to society.
B. The State's Interest in Detaining Juvenile Runaways Is Inadequate
To Deny Those Juveniles Procedural Due Process Protection
The Mathews test requires an evaluation of the state's interest in the
Becca Bill's runaway detention provisions and how a mandatory judicial
review of a juvenile's commitment to detention would affect the state's
ability to satisfy that interest. Under the Becca Bill's statement of intent,
the state interest in detaining juvenile runaways includes (1) the state's
traditional but ambiguously defined parens patriae role in caring for
neglected children and (2) its interest in defending and supporting
parents' rights to custody of runaway children.189 This statement of intent
recognizes parents as the most qualified people to make decisions about
their children's lives. 9 ° The statement of intent describes the secure
facilities and the new procedures in the bill for dealing with runaways as
tools to assist children for parents, law enforcement, and state
184. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992).
185. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967).
186. See Parham v. J.R-, 442 U.S. 584, 601 (1979).
187. See Schall v Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984).
188. See In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d 1, 45-46, 857 P.2d 989, 1011 (1993).
189. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.010 (1998).
190. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.010. ("Presumptively, the experience and maturity of parents
make them better qualified to establish guidelines beneficial to and protective of their
children .... [T]he right and responsibility for establishing reasonable guidelines for the family unit
belongs to the adults within that unit.").
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agencies.' 9' The legislature announced its intention that secure CRCs
provide services to runaway juveniles for a limited time. 92 The
legislature indicated that the time a juvenile spends in a CRC should be
used to conduct assessments of the needs of the juveniles and their
families. 93 These assessments should connect the juveniles and their
families with longer-term services to address the problems that first led
the juveniles to run away. 9
The statute's failure to achieve these purposes diminishes the state's
interest in depriving a juvenile's liberty interest under Mathews. In
reality, the secure CRCs have not accomplished the legislature's goals.'95
While secure CRCs are intended to protect, not punish,'96 housing
juveniles in detention centers is much closer to a punitive detention.
Experience suggests that juveniles do not receive needed services outside
of the secure CRCs.'97 This reality undercuts the state's expressed goal of
reuniting families and ensuring these juveniles receive needed services,
by force if necessary.
Similarly, while the state's interest in supporting parents' control of
their children is important, the juvenile's fundamental interests are also
important and may limit the state's duty to support parents' interests' 9
The state's parens patriae duty, often invoked to decrease the extent of
juveniles' due process protections, was applied in In re Sumey 99 to stand
for the proposition that the state must protect a child when parental
actions threaten the child's physical or mental health.20° In this case,
while the legislature has expressed its intent to protect parents' custodial
rights through the Becca Bill, the state cannot ignore its duty to juveniles
by letting parental interests eclipse juveniles' constitutional liberty
interests. The state should ensure that juveniles detained under the Becca
Bill have at least the protection of a hearing.
191. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.010.
192. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.010.
193. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.010.
194. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.0 10.
195. See supra Part I.B.
196. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.010.
197. See Teichroeb, supra note 70.
198. See, e.g., In re Sumey, 94 Wash. 2d 757, 762, 621 P.2d 108, 110 (1980).
199. 94 Wash. 2d 757, 621 P.2d 108 (1980).
200. See id. at 764, 621 P.2d at 111.
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In addition, because the additional fiscal and administrative burdens of
a twenty-four hour detention review are minimal, the state's interest in
avoiding these costs does not justify a denial of due process. The juvenile
courts already provide hearings to juveniles in emergency situations and
have great experience evaluating juveniles' needs. For example, the
juvenile courts provide probable cause hearings within twenty-four hours
to any juvenile held in secure detention because a law enforcement
officer found probable cause to believe that the child violated a court
order.0° Juvenile courts also must provide custody hearings within
seventy-two hours when a child is taken into shelter care.202 Following
passage of the Becca Bill, the number of juveniles detained in
Washington skyrocketed. Between 1993 and 1997, the number of youths
detained increased by nearly 700%.203 Detention days imposed by
juvenile courts rose from approximately 1000 per year before passage of
the Becca Bill to more than 12,300 per year in 1997. 04 Most of the
additional detention days served resulted from changes created by the
Becca Bill. 25 The legislature, in creating the Becca Bill, authorized this
massive expansion of juvenile detention and court involvement. By
comparison, the number of hearings that would be required to bring the
runaway provision into compliance with procedural due process would
be slight.2 6 Therefore, because protecting the procedural due process
rights of juveniles detained under the runaway provisions would not
require considerable additional state resources, the state's interest in
denying these procedures is insufficient.
201. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.065 (1998).
202. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.060(l)(b) (1998). Shelter care is temporary physical care in a
licensed facility or unlicensed home of a child removed from his or her home by Child Protective
Services. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.34.060(1).
203. See In re M.B., 101 Wash. App. 425,438, 3 P.3d 780, 787 (2000).
204. See id.
205. See id. ("Approximately 60 percent and 27 percent of the detentions in 1997 occurred for
violating ARY and truancy orders respectively.").
206. The limited number of secure CRC beds (34 beds were available in Jan. 2000) inherently
limits the number of runaways who could be held in the facilities and require such hearings. See
supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
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C. Because the Risk of Erroneous Deprivation of a Child's Liberty Is
Great, the State's Current Secure CRC Provisions Violate
Juveniles 'Procedural Due Process Rights
The Becca Bill's detention provisions do not satisfy the Mathews test
because there is a high risk of erroneous deprivation of a child's liberty
interest in the absence ofjudicial review at a meaningful time. The Becca
Bill allows law enforcement officers to place the child in a secure CRC at
their discretion or at the request of a parent. 7 Once in the facility, only
the administrator of the facility reviews the child's detention; that review
is limited to deciding whether transferring the child to a semi-secure
facility would create a risk of the child running away from it.208 The
administrator is given no discretion to decide whether the child should
even be at the secure CRC. As a result, besides the administrator, the
only person with any authority to remove the juvenile from the facility is
the child's parent.2" In analogous situations, courts have found judicial
review of detention within seventy-two hours or less is the only way to
avoid the risk of erroneous deprivation."' Only by having such a review
do many detention schemes comply with the due process clause.21'
The Becca Bill's secure CRC provision is similar to the statutory
provision rejected in In re Harris."2 In that case, the challenged statute
allowed a mental-health-care professional to commit a woman for
evaluation and treatment by relying only on a mother's affidavit that her
daughter was dangerous." 3 The court rejected this procedure because the
risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty was too high.1 Likewise, the
risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty in the Becca Bill's procedures is
too high because the statute allows the state to commit a child to a secure
207. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.060 (1998); see also supra notes 52-55 and accompanying
text
208. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.130 (1998); see also supra notes 64-67 and accompanying
text.
209. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.130; see also supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
210. See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 277 (1984); In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d 1, 46-47,
857 P.2d 989, 1011 (1993); see also supra Part ll.B.3.
211. See, e.g., Schall, 467 U.S. at 277; Young, 122 Wash. 2d at 46-47, 857 P.2d at 1011; see also
supra Part I.B.3.
212. 98 Wash. 2d 276, 286, 654 P.2d 109, 114 (1982). It should be noted, however, that the
Harris court did not specify whether Ms. Harris was a minor.
213. See id. at 286, 654 P.2d at 114.
214. See id. at 287, 654 P.2d 109, 114 (1982).
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facility at the request of a parent with no judicial review of that
commitment.
Some might argue that there is no risk of erroneous deprivation of a
child's liberty as long as a parent authorizes that detention, either
expressly or implicitly, by reporting the child as a runaway. However,
this assumption is misguided. Parents who are abusive or fail to provide
for their children defy the legislature's rationale that parents are better
qualified to make decisions that affect their children than the children
themselves.1 5 Many runaway children have made reasoned decisions to
leave abusive situations or parents who are delinquent in protection and
support. 16 Although the legislature intended the secure CRCs to be used
for assessment, treatment, and protection of at-risk juveniles,217 there is a
risk that a parent's detention request may contravene this intent.
The risk of erroneous deprivation of juveniles' liberty is particularly
grave because of the great harm it can cause. The Harris court found that
"[t]he injurious effect of [involuntary civil] commitment can be
manifested in a very short time. 218 Ms. Harris's situation was similar to
that of many runaways who might be detained in a secure CRC; the court
pointed out that the record reflected no more justification for Ms.
Harris's summons than her mother's affidavit that she was dangerous.219
The court warned that incarcerating people "for their own good" may
have the opposite effect, frightening them away from needed services.2
Child advocates have expressed the same concerns about the Becca Bill:
threatened with being involuntarily locked up, endangered runaways may
215. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.010 (1998).
216. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (recognizing that incidents of abuse and
neglect show that parents may act against best interests of their children, despite legal presumptions
to contrary).
217. See Kelli Schmidt, Comment, "Who Are You to Say What My Best Interest Is? " Minors' Due
Process Rights When Admitted By Parents for Inpatient Mental Health Treatment, 71 Wash. L. Rev.
1187, 1193 (1996). One commentator noted:
A parent may have distorted perceptions and may blame all family problems on a child's
behavior, while the child's behavior may be unrelated to mental illness but, instead, be in
response to changes in the family structure, such as divorce, parental conflict, and family moves
which sever social support networks. Not infrequently, the parent admitting the child for [mental
health] treatment suffers from mental illness, or is experiencing extreme crisis that makes it
difficult to cope with parenting responsibilities.
Id. at 1207 (citations omitted).
218. Harris, 98 Wash. 2d at 279, 654 P.2d at I11.
219. See id. at 286, 654 P.2d at 114.
220. Id. at 288, 654 P.2d at 115.
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avoid those who are trying to help, particularly when those helpers are
police officers.22 Judicial or legislative recognition that juveniles have a
right to liberty and to judicial review of their detention, even "for their
own good," could make juveniles more trusting of the state and the
secure CRC system and encourage more juveniles to cooperate with state
agencies.
Damian's story is anecdotal but illustrative of the possible abuses to
which this statute might be susceptible.222 His initial stay at the CRC was
precisely what the legislature intended: he was protected and reunited
with his family, and he and his family received access to services
unavailable to them before he entered the CRC. His second stay at the
CRC, however, achieved none of the goals set for the CRCs. Rather, his
mother used detention as a tool to punish him for disobedience, not
because she believed him to be in danger.2"
In light of the Mathews test, Damian's experience exemplifies how the
Becca Bill currently violates procedural due process. The state had no
interest in Damian's commitment to detention during his second visit; he
was not running away, so his parents' custody and care interests were not
in need of the state's protection, and he could not benefit from the
services the state could offer through his stay in the CRC. In the absence
of review of his commitment to detention, Damian was needlessly and
erroneously deprived of his liberty.
IV. DUE PROCESS REQUIRES JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
COMMITMENT TO DETENTION UNDER THE BECCA BILL
WITHIN TWENTY-FOUR HOURS
Washington must bring the Becca Bill's commitment to detention
procedures into compliance with the U.S. Constitution and the
Washington Constitution by providing juveniles with a hearing within
twenty-four hours of commitment to detention to minimize the risk of
erroneous deprivation of the juvenile's liberty interest.24 This conclusion
221. See Houtz, supra note 24.
222. See supra notes 1-I I and accompanying text.
223. See Teichroeb, supra note 1.
224. Because the juvenile courts have been given exclusive original jurisdiction in Washington
over juvenile delinquency proceedings as well as a number of civil matters affecting juveniles, see
Wash. Rev. Code § 13.04.030 (1998), the juvenile court judges and commissioners have consid-
erable experience in adjudicating decisions about the best interests of children and in choosing
appropriate placements for at-risk children.
1425
Washington Law Review
has four premises: (1) U.S. Supreme Court precedent suggests that a
hearing must occur within forty-eight hours, (2) the circumstances of
juveniles' detention in the secure CRCs dictate that the only meaningful
time for a hearing to take place would be within the first twenty-four
hours, (3) a twenty-four hour hearing will allow the Becca Bill to fulfill
its purposes more effectively, and (4) a hearing within twenty-four hours
will bring the Bill closer to complying with the JJDPA requirements.
The legislature must amend the Becca Bill or courts reviewing the
Bill's provisions must require that the procedures be amended to allow a
hearing within forty-eight hours at a minimum to meet current minimal
procedural due process standards established by the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Court in Schall v. Martin,225 reviewing pretrial detention of
juveniles, recognized that the statutory provision of a hearing within
seventy-two hours met both the requirements of due process and the
Fourth Amendment's requirement of a prompt probable cause hearing. 26
Seven years later, the Court in Riverside v. McLaughlin227 held that a
probable cause hearing must occur within forty-eight hours of
detention. 28 This forty-eight hour hearing requirement should also apply
to procedural due process considerations and should extend to all
juveniles detained in secure facilities. The risk of erroneous deprivation
of liberty is even greater in the case of a child placed in a CRC than
under the system examined in Schall. Juveniles detained under the statute
examined in Schall made an initial appearance before a Family Court
judge before being committed for pretrial detention; the seventy-two
hour hearing that met due process requirements was in addition to that
initial appearance.229 Juveniles placed in CRCs have no initial appearance
before their detention begins.
In addition to the state's interest in protecting juveniles, the Schall
Court recognized both the state's interest in protecting the detained
juveniles and society from the potential consequences of the juvenile's
criminal acts, and the concerns of the state surrounding high recidivism
rates among juvenile offenders. 230 Regardless of these additional state
interests, the Court held that the juvenile's liberty interest required
225. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
226. See id. at 277.
227. 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
228. See id. at 56.
229. See Schall, 467 U.S. at 277.
230. See id. at 264-65.
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hearings within seventy-two hours."' If the state's interest is not strong
enough in the case of a juvenile who may have committed a violent
crime to justify denying that juvenile basic procedural due process, then
the state's interest in holding a child who may be a runaway cannot be
strong enough to justify denying the child basic procedural due process
rights. Likewise, because the legislature has already provided a twenty-
four hour hearing for juveniles taken to secure CRCs for violating a court
order, it should not deny that hearing to children who have not broken
the law.
Second, given the shortened detention period of the Becca Bill's
runaway provisions, a twenty-four hour commitment to detention hearing
would best fulfill the due process requirement that the hearing take place
"at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. ' 2 If a juvenile will
be spending at most five days in the secure CRC, a hearing at the earliest
opportunity is likely to be most effective. This will ensure that children
who are misplaced in the CRC do not become disaffected with state
social services and suffer harm from the placement. If the child is aware
that the court will not be reviewing his or her detention for three days,
the child might not make full use of the resources available through the
CRC. A child who is resentful of being placed in the facility and who
does not feel fairly treated is less likely to cooperate with the facility
staff and service providers. In contrast, a child who has had an
opportunity to be heard by a judge and receive some review of that
placement may be more cooperative afterwards. As Justice Fortas
observed in In re Gault, "the appearance as well as the actuality of
fairness, impartiality and orderliness-in short, the essentials of due
process-may be a more impressive and more therapeutic attitude so far
as the juvenile is concerned. '' 3 With at most five days to assess the
child's needs, a cooperative attitude may make the difference between
achieving the statute's goals of assessment and enrollment in needed
services and failure to meet those goals.
Third, the Becca Bill's procedures should provide a hearing within
twenty-four hours of commitment to detention to ensure that the facilities
maintain their intended function: to provide children protection from the
streets and provide a safe place for staff to evaluate and introduce them
23 1. See id. at 277.
232. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); see also supra notes 165-68.
233. 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967).
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to the support services they need to remain at home.23 ' The secure CRCs
can most effectively perform these functions if the juveniles staying in
them are actually in need of the services they can provide. If the secure
CRCs can be used by parents as punishment for juveniles who disobey
bott are not in danger, the CRCs will be limited in their capacity and
ability to serve children who really need help. Juveniles who have been
detained in this fashion will not be amenable to cooperating with the
state.235 With such a review, only those children the statute aims to assist,
children absent from home without parental consent who could be safely
returned to their homes with state intervention and assistance, would be
held. Those children who should not be detained would be released
immediately, before the detention could cause additional harm. The state
could also identify more quickly those children who need more serious
and extensive state intervention.
Finally, the Becca Bill's procedures should provide juveniles with a
hearing within twenty-four hours of admission to a secure CRC in order
to bring the state closer to complying with the JJDPA. The rules
promulgating the JJDPA require that states provide a court appearance
within twenty-four hours, exclusive of weekends and holidays, for any
status offender placed in a secure detention facility.2 6 With the JJDPA
Congress has recognized the procedural due process rights of juvenile
status offenders by providing them with even more protection than that
provided by the U.S. Supreme Court. Congress has also determined that
this procedural due process right is so imperative to juveniles that it has
conditioned funding of state juvenile justice programs on compliance
with this requirement. 37 Washington should follow the wisdom of this
determination by providing juvenile runaways with a judicial review of
their commitment to detention within twenty-four hours.
234. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.32A.010 (1998).
235. To ensure that the goals of the Becca Bill are met, the state must also ensure that the services
children need are available to them after they leave the facilities. See supra notes 192-94 and
accompanying text.
236. See 28 C.F.R. § 31.303()(iii)(2) (1999). However, even this change would not bring the
statute into complete compliance with the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act because
the regulation allows the State to continue to detain a juvenile in a secure detention facility for only
24 hours after the initial court appearance.
237. 42 U.S.C. § 5633(c) (1994).
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V. CONCLUSION
Procedural due process requires that the state give juveniles runaways
some judicial review of commitment to detention in the secure CRCs.
Juvenile runaways have a fundamental liberty interest in freedom from
bodily restraint. The state's interests in protecting juvenile runaways and
assisting their parents are not threatened by providing such review and
do not justify withholding it. The risk that a juvenile will be erroneously
deprived of liberty by existing procedures is great and the harm this
deprivation may cause is great. The Washington State Legislature should
amend the Becca Bill's runaway provisions or courts reviewing the
runaway provisions should require the State to provide judicial review of
the commitment to detention in a secure CRC within twenty-four hours
of a juvenile's placement in the CRC.
Judicial review of commitment to detention early in the juvenile's
stay will maximize both the usefulness of that stay and the likelihood that
juveniles will be encouraged to trust state offers of assistance. Due
process requires that a hearing preceding deprivation of liberty take place
at a meaningful time. Providing a review within twenty-four hours of
commitment to detention would provide maximum protection from
erroneous deprivation of liberty and allow more time for the state to
perform the assessments and provide the services required by the statute
after this judicial review is completed. Thus, the proposed review would
more effectively achieve the Bill's purpose and bring the Becca Bill into
compliance with the mandates of procedural due process and federal law.
Providing judicial review within twenty-four hours would assist
juveniles like Damian placed in a secure CRC for reasons other than
those envisioned by the legislature. The second time Damian was placed
in a secure CRC, simply because his mother was angry at him, he
expressed discouragement and frustration at being locked up in the center
again: "I felt like, I'm trying my hardest. I'm wondering, 'Am I really as
bad as I was last year?" '' s At the same time, amending the Becca Bill to
provide a twenty-four hour commitment to detention review hearing
would allow the state to continue assisting children like Becca Hedman
and their families.
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